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Abstract
The paper studies both the convexity and average-convexity properties for a particular
class of cooperative TU-games called common pool games. The common pool situation
involves a cost function as well as a (weakly decreasing) average joint production function.
Firstly, it is shown that, if the relevant cost function is a linear function, then the common
pool games are convex games. The convexity, however, fails whenever cost functions are
arbitrary. We present sucient conditions involving the cost functions (like weakly de-
creasing marginal costs as well as weakly decreasing average costs) and the average joint
production function in order to guarantee the convexity of the common pool game. A
similar approach is eective to investigate a relaxation of the convexity property known
as the average-convexity property for a cooperative game. An example illustrates that
oligopoly games are a special case of common pool games whenever the average joint
production function represents an inverse demand function.
Keywords: common pool situation, cooperative TU-game, common pool TU-game,
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1 Introduction and background
The \tragedy of the commons" is a well-known phenomenon throughout the exhaustive lit-
erature on common pool resources. According to the solution part of non-cooperative game
theory (i.e., pure Nash equilibria), the common pool resources are overused; in other words,
the commonly owned lake is overshed by the society of shermen and the tragedy of the
commons occurs (cf. [4], [11], [9]). In order to avoid the tragedy of the commons, one may
focus on a (partially) cooperative game theoretic approach to the common pool situation,
in which cooperation among shermen is assumed to some extent. For that purpose, the
partition function form (or coalition structure) approach was treated in [3], which deals with
the non-cooperative game solution (i.e., Nash equilibrium for a suitably chosen game in nor-
mal form) as well as the cooperative game solution (i.e., (non)existence of core allocations
for two types of appropriately chosen cooperative TU-games). In this paper we deal with a
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fully cooperative game theoretic approach to the common pool situation, following the overall
treatment in [6], [7], [8]. Our treatment is fully based on the so-called common pool coop-
erative TU-game, which arises directly from the underlying normal form game by applying
the standard maxmin-technique. The main goal of this paper is to study the convexity prop-
erty (and related notions) for this common pool TU-game, in which dierent types of cost
functions are investigated to guarantee the convexity of the underlying game. In the eld of
cooperative game theory, the convexity of a game is an extremely appealing feature in order
to determine various solution concepts (like the existence, structure and largeness of the core).
Let the model of an economy with a common pool resource be described by a society of
shermen, denoted by the nite set N := f1; 2; : : : ; ng, who are employed on a commonly
owned lake. For any sherman i 2 N , let xi  0 represent the amount of labour that
i expends to catch sh. Clearly, the overall amount of labour is given by
P
j2N xj . The
relevant technology that determines the amount of sh caught is considered to be a function
of the overall amount of labour, called the joint production function f : R+ ! R+ satisfying
f(0) = 0. The distribution of sh among shermen is supposed to be proportional to the
amount of labour expended by individual shermen. In other words, the amount of sh
assigned to sherman i is given by xiP
j2N xj
f(Pj2N xj). The price of sh is normalized to be
one unit of money and let c : R+ ! R+ denote an arbitrarily chosen cost function of labour
satisfying c(0) = 0. Generally speaking, the cost function includes salary costs (e.g., unit
price of labour in case of a linear cost function) and, if it applies (in case of non-linear cost
functions), taxes, social security and insurance costs, and so on, due to the labour input.
Due to the non-cooperative game theoretic approach, the common pool economy is modelled
as a (non-cooperative) game in normal form Γ = hX1;X2; : : : ;Xn; F1; F2; : : : ; Fni, where the
player set N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng represents the society of shermen, and, for any sherman i 2 N ,
a strategy xi 2 Xi of the strategy set Xi  R+ represents the amount of labour by i and the
netto income function Fi : X1 X2  : : :Xn ! R is given by
Fi((xk)k2N ) := xiP
j2N xj
 f(Pj2N xj)− c(xi) for all i 2 N , all xk 2 Xk, k 2 N . (1.1)
Throughout the paper, it is supposed that every sherman i 2 N is initially endowed with
labour the amount of wi  0 and thus, the strategy set Xi of player i equals the interval
[0; wi] := fy 2 R j 0  y  wig. In accordance with the solution part of non-cooperative
game theory, every sherman i will choose his labour input xi to maximize his own netto
income Fi(xi; (xk)k2Nnfig), xi 2 [0; wi], given the labour inputs (xk)k2Nnfig of the other
shermen k, k 2 Nnfig. Under certain circumstances (like linearity of the cost function
with marginal constant cost c and strict concavity of the joint production function f in
that f 00 < 0 and f 0 > 0), there exists a unique non-cooperative game solution called Nash
equilibrium. The main result, however, states that the overall amount of labour inputs by
the Nash equilibrium (xk)k2N exceeds the Pareto ecient level (or equivalently, the social
optimum) x, that is
P
k2N x

k > x
. The social optimum x is implicitly determined by the
unique solution of the joint maximization problem f(x) − c  x, x  0, where the constant
c  0 denotes the marginal cost of the linear cost function. In short, the commonly owned
lake is overshed by the shermen and the tragedy of the commons occurs.
As mentioned before, this paper is devoted to a cooperative game theoretic approach to the
common pool economy. Our rst task is to transform the (non-cooperative) game in normal
form Γ, as given by (1.1), into a so-called cooperative game (with transferable utility) and
this transformation is fully based on the known maxmin-technique. In order to dene the
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characteristic function v : P(N)! R on the power set P(N) := fS j S  Ng of the player set
N , let the worth v(S), for every coalition S  N , arise from the two-person non-cooperative
setting in which coalition S is confronted with its complementary coalition NnS in such a way
that members of S aim to maximize their \worst" cases. In other words, for every coalition
S  N , S 6= ;, the members of S will choose their own individual strategies (xk)k2S to
maximize the worst case in that the opponents of S choose their own individual strategies
(xk)k2NnS such that the overall netto income
P
j2S Fj((xk)k2N ) of coalition S is minimal
(given the strategies by members of S). Under the assumption of the linearity of the joint
cost function with marginal constant cost c, the induced cooperative TU-game hN; vi assigns
to every coalition S  N , S 6= ;, the following worth:
v(S) := max
(xk)k2S2(Xk)k2S
min
(xk)k2NnS2(Xk)k2NnS
X
j2S
Fj((xk)k2N )
= max
(xk)k2S2(Xk)k2S
min
(xk)k2NnS2(Xk)k2NnS
24X
j2S
xj
35  f( Pj2N xj)P
j2N
xj
− c 
24X
j2S
xj
35
= max
y
min
z

y  f(y + z)
y + z
− c  y

(here y :=
P
j2S
xj and z :=
P
j2NnS
xj)
= max
0ywS
min
0zwNnS

y  h(y + z)− c  y

(1.2)
By taking into account the individual endowments wi, i 2 N , it is supposed that the overall
endowments of the members of any coalition T , T  N , is simply obtained by addition
(additive sum), denoted as wT :=
P
j2T wj . This additional assumption elucidates why the
restrictions 0  y  wS and 0  z  wNnS respectively appear in (1.2). Moreover, the
average joint production function h : R+ ! R+ is given by h(x) := f(x)x for all x > 0. The
standard assumption of concavity of the joint production function f (i.e., f 00  0) implies
that the average joint production function h is weakly decreasing (i.e., h0  0). Thus, for
every coalition S  N , S 6= ;, the minimization problem in (1.2) is solved for z = wNnS ,
i.e., each opponent j 2 NnS invests his total endowment wj to minimize the overall netto
income to the coalition S given their own (overall) strategy y, 0  y  wS . In summary, the
characteristic function v : P(N)! R of the common pool TU-game hN; vi (with respect to a
linear cost function with marginal cost c) is given by v(;) := 0 and
v(S) := max
0ywS

y  h(y + wNnS)− c  y

for all S  N , S 6= ;. (1.3)
The common pool TU-game hN; vi is said to be convex (or supermodular) if its characteristic
function v : P(N) ! R, as given by (1.3), satises one of the following two equivalent
conditions (cf. [10], [1]):
v(S) + v(T )  v(S [ T ) + v(S \ T ) for all S; T  N , or equivalently
v(S [ fig) − v(S)  v(T [ fig) − v(T ) whenever S  T  Nnfig: (1.4)
The main result of this paper (cf. the forthcoming Theorem 3.1) states that, without any fur-
ther assumption on the weakly decreasing (average joint production) function h, the common
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pool TU-game hN; vi (with respect to a linear cost function) is a convex game. In addition, its
tricky, but elegant proof turns out to be extremely helpful to investigate the convexity (and
a related notion called average convexity) of common pool games with respect to non-linear
cost functions.
2 Two examples of Common Pool Games, e.g. oligopoly games
Denition 2.1. Let N be a nite set of individuals (players) and let wi  0 denote player i’s
endowment. For any T  N , denote the total of its members’ endowments by wT :=
P
j2T wj ,
where w(;) := 0. With any joint production function f : R+ ! R+ satisfying f(0) = 0 as well
as concavity (i.e., f 00(x)  0 for all x > 0), there is associated its weakly decreasing average
joint production function h : R+ ! R+, given by h(x) := f(x)x for all x > 0. Further, let
c : R+ ! R+ be an arbitrarily twice-dierentiable cost function satisfying c(0) = 0.
The corresponding common pool cooperative TU-game hN; vi is dened in such a way that its
player set N consists of the users of the common pool resource and its characteristic function
v : P(N)! R is given by v(;) := 0 and
v(S) := max
0ywS

y  h(y + wNnS)− c(y)

for all S  N , S 6= ;. (2.1)
Before we start to discuss two examples of common pool TU-games, we remark, without
going into details, that the common pool game hN; vi of (2.1) is a monotonic game, i.e.,
v(T )  v(S) for all S  T  N or equivalently, v(S [ fig)  v(S) for all i 2 N and all
S  Nnfig. Particularly, v(S [ fig) = v(S) for all S  Nnfig whenever wi = 0. In words, a
player with no initial endowment at all is a dummy player in the common pool game hN; vi
of (2.1). Consequently, the convexity condition (1.4) in which a dummy player i is involved
(determined by wi = 0) is trivially satised by a common pool game. Generally speaking, it
is supposed that any player possesses a positive endowment.
Example 2.2. (common pool games versus oligopoly games; cf. [12])
In the economic setting of an oligopoly market with n rms producing a homogeneous good,
let wi  0 represent the production capacity of rm i, denote the corresponding cost function
by c : R+ ! R+ and let h : R+ ! R+ represent a weakly decreasing inverse demand
function. For any S  N , S 6= ;, the prot function S : R+ ! R+ for coalition S is given
by S(y) := y h(y+wNnS)− c(y) for all y  0, where the variable y refers to the production
level of coalition S (assuming all the opponents of S produce full capacity). In other words,
common pool TU-games reduce to oligopoly games as soon as the average joint production
function can be interpreted as some inverse demand function.
As a particular example of common pool games, let the average joint production function h
be an inverse demand function of the form h(x) := max [0; a− x] for all x > 0. In other
words, the underlying joint production function f is given by a quadratic function, namely
f(x) := x  (a − x) for all 0  x  a and f(x) := 0 for all x  a. Most important, h is
a weakly decreasing function. In addition, suppose that the cost function c is a quadratic
function of the form c(y) := c2  y2 + c1  y for all y  0 and certain constants c2  0,
0  c1  a (notice that a linear cost function arises whenever c2 = 0). Our aim is to
determine the associated common pool game hN; vi of (2.1). For any coalition S  N , S 6= ;,
the maximization problem (2.1) with respect to coalition S involves the maximization of
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the objective function gS(y) := y 

a− c1 − wNnS − (1 + c2)  y

under the two constraints
0  y  wS and y  a−wNnS . Generally speaking, the unconstrained maximization problem
involving the objective quadratic function gS(y) attains its maximum for y = S , where
S :=
a−c1−wNnS
2(1+c2) . Note that gS(y) = (1 + c2)  y  [2  S − y] for all y  0.
Obviously, if S  0, then the maximizer yS of the maximization problem (2.1) equals zero,
thus yS = 0 and v(S) = 0. In case S > 0, then the maximizer equals S or wS or a−wNnS ,
whichever is less. For the moment, suppose wS  a − wNnS or equivalently, wN  a. To
conclude with, if 0  S  wS , then yS = S and thus, v(S) = gS(S) = (1 + c2)  (S)2. If
S  wS , then yS = wS and thus, v(S) = gS(wS) = (1 + c2) wS  [2  S − wS ]. In summary,
we arrive at the following results concerning the maximizer yS as well as the worth v(S) for
any nonempty coalition S (provided wN  a):
yS =
8><>:
0 if S  0;
S if 0  S  wS ;
wS if S  wS ;
(2.2)
v(S) =
8><>:
0 if S  0;
(1 + c2)  (S)2 if 0  S  wS ;
(1 + c2)  wS  [2  S −wS ] if S  wS ;
(2.3)
In terms of the players’ endowments wi, i 2 N , the intercept a in the inverse demand function,
and the cost gures c1 and c2, we present the worth v(S) of (2.3) as follows (provided wN  a):
v(S) =
8>><>>:
0 if S  0; i.e., wS  wN − (a− c1);
[a− c1 − wN ]  wS − c2  (wS)2 if S  wS ; i.e., wS  a−c1−wN1+2c2 ;
[a−c1−wNnS]2
4(1+c2) otherwise:
(2.4)
Proposition 2.3. In the context of Example 2.2, suppose that the overall amount of endow-
ment wN exceeds the intercept a in the inverse demand function, i.e., the overuse condition
wN  a. Then the common pool (or oligopoly) game hN; vi of (2.4) reduces as follows:
v(;) = 0 and
v(S) =

max

0; a− c1 − wNnS
2
4  (1 + c2) for all S  N , S 6= ;. (2.5)
Further, the common pool (or oligopoly) game hN; vi of (2.5) is a convex game (i.e., (1.4) holds
since it is a positive multiple of the square of a so-called bankruptcy game, the characteristic
function of which, in turn, is known to be convex as well as monotonic).
Proof. Suppose wN  a. Clearly, for any S  N , S 6= ;, it holds that a − wNnS  wS
and moreover, if S > 0, then S =
a−c1−wNnS
2(1+c2) < a − c1 − wNnS  a − wNnS as well as
v(S) = gS(S) = (1 + c2)  (S)2 = [a−c1−wNnS]
2
4(1+c2) . This proves (2.5). Dene the characteristic
function uE;w : P(N) ! R of the so-called bankruptcy TU-game hN;uE;wi by uE;w(;) := 0
and uE;w(S) := max

0; E −wNnS

for all S  N , S 6= ;. Here the estate E := a−c1, whereas
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the claims of the claimants (players) are identied with their endowments. For convenience’
sake, write u instead of uE;w. Since v(S) =
(u(S))2
4(1+c2) for all S  N , the common pool (or
oligopoly) game hN; vi of (2.5) is a positive multiple of the square hN;u2i of the bankruptcy
game hN;ui. It is well-known that bankruptcy games are convex as well as monotonic (cf.
[1]). Due to the convexity and monotonicity of the bankruptcy game hN;ui, we conclude that
its square hN;u2i is a convex game too. Indeed, for all i 2 N and all S  T  Nnfig, the
following chain of (in)equalities holds:
[u(S [ fig)]2 − [u(S)]2
= [u(S [ fig)− u(S)]  [u(S [ fig) + u(S)]
 [u(T [ fig) − u(T )]  [u(S [ fig) + u(S)] (by convexity of the game hN;ui)
 [u(T [ fig) − u(T )]  [u(T [ fig) + u(T )] (by monotonicity of the game hN;ui)
= [u(T [ fig)]2 − [u(T )]2
This completes the full proof of the convexity statements. 2
Proposition 2.4. In the context of Example 2.2, suppose that the overall amount of endow-
ment wN is bounded above by a−c12(1+c2) , i.e., the no-overuse condition wN  a−c12(1+c2) . Then the
common pool (or oligopoly) game hN; vi of (2.4) reduces as follows: v(;) = 0 and
v(S) = [a− c1 − wN ]  wS − c2  (wS)2 for all S  N , S 6= ;. (2.6)
In words, the common pool (or oligopoly) game hN; vi of (2.6) is the sum of an non-negative
multiple of an additive game (arising from the players’ endowments) and a non-positive mul-
tiple of the square of this additive game. Hence, hN; vi is a so-called concave game in that
v(T [ fig)− v(T )  v(S [ fig) − v(S) whenever S  T  Nnfig: (2.7)
In case c2 > 0 (i.e., a non-linear cost function) and wk > 0 for all k 2 N , the inequality in
(2.7) is strict and thus, the common pool (or oligopoly) game hN; vi of (2.6) fails to be convex
(under the given circumstances with reference to a non-linear cost function).
Proof. Suppose wN  a−c12(1+c2) . Clearly, for any S  N , S 6= ;, it holds that wS  a− wNnS
(due to wN  a − c1  a) and moreover, wS  wN  a−c1−wN1+2c2 or equivalently, S  wS .
Thus, v(S) = gS(wS) = [a− c1 − wN ] wS−c2 (wS)2 for all S  N , S 6= ;. This proves (2.6).
From (2.6), we derive that, for all i 2 N and all S  Nnfig, the following equality holds:
v(S [ fig) − v(S) = [a− c1 − wN ]  wi − c2  (wi)2 − 2  c2  wi  wS (2.8)
In view of (2.8), the concavity condition v(T [ fig) − v(T )  v(S [ fig) − v(S) is equivalent
to c2 wi wT  c2 wi wS (provided S  T ). The latter (weak) inequality holds true because
the assumption S  T yields wT  wS. This proves (2.7). In case c2 > 0 and wk > 0 for all
k 2 N , then the strict inequality wT > wS holds whenever S $ T and thus, the convexity
condition (1.4) fails to hold under these circumstances (with reference to a non-linear cost
function). This completes the full proof of the concavity and convexity statements. 2
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Remark 2.5. Oligopoly TU-games were studied in [12] with reference to a particular inverse
demand function of the form h(x) := max [0; a− x] for all x > 0 as well as linear costs
functions with marginal costs ci, i 2 N (unlike the foregoing approach, each rm i has its
own marginal cost ci, besides its own production capacity wi). With this oligopoly situation,
there is associated the TU-game hN; vi given by v(;) := 0 and (cf. [12], Lemma 4, page 194)
v(S) =
1
4


a−min
j2S
cj − wNnS
2
for all S  N , S 6= ;. (2.9)
In this framework, two fundamental assumptions do play a role, namely the expression a−wN
is bounded above and below in the sense that maxj2N [cj − wj ]  a−wN  minj2N [cj + wj].
Clearly, the lower bound (i.e., a− wN  cj − wj for all j 2 N) implies that a −minj2S cj −
wNnS  0 for all S  N , S 6= ;. Due to this observation, (2.9) resembles (2.5). The oligopoly
game hN; vi of (2.9) is proven to be a convex game whenever all marginal costs are equal (i.e.,
cj = ck for all j; k 2 N). Necessary and sucient (but extremely complicated) conditions for
the convexity of this type of an oligopoly game are presented in [12] (Theorem 3 on page 195).
Notice that our (common pool) model described by (2.1) is much more general than (2.9)
since the average joint production function is not xed at all (except to be weakly decreasing).
Example 2.6. Let the underlying joint production function f be given by a bounded linear
function, namely f(x) := min [  x; ] for all x  0, where  > 0,  > 0. Thus, the average
joint production function h is a weakly decreasing function so that h(x) =  for all 0 < x   ,
and h(x) = x for all x   . In the framework of a linear cost function c(y) := c  y for all
y  0 and a certain 0 < c < , we are able to determine the associated common pool game
hN; vi of (2.1). We distinguish two cases concerning the sizes wN and  .
Case one. Suppose wN   . Since any feasible allocation y 2 [0; wS ] satises y + wNnS 
wN   , we obtain that the maximization problem (2.1) with respect to coalition S involves
the linear objective function y  [− c]. Its associated maximizer yS is given by yS = wS and
hence, v(S) = wS  [− c] for all S  N , S 6= ;. In words, if wN   , then the common
pool game hN; vi of (2.1) reduces to a so-called additive game (arising from the players’
endowments) and thus, the convexity condition (1.4) holds clearly.
Case two. In the remainder suppose wN >

 . Let S  N , S 6= ;. In order to determine
the worth v(S), we have to compare the maximum of the rst (linear) objective function
g1(y) := y  [− c] restricted to the (possibly empty) interval [0;  − wNnS ] versus the
second objective function g2(y) := y 
h

y+wNnS
− c
i
restricted to (the positive part of) the
interval [ − wNnS ; wS ]. Firstly, note that g1(y)  g2(y) for all y 2 [0;  − wNnS ] and
further, g1(y) = g2(y) for y =

−wNnS . Secondly, note that the unconstrained maximization
problem involving the second objective function g2(y) attains its maximum for y = γS , where
γS := −wNnS +
q
wNnS
c and its objective value equals γs 
q
c
wNnS

hp
 −pc  wNnS
i
.
Obviously, the relevant constraints 0  γS  wS and γS + wNnS   respectively, are
equivalent to the next constraints concerning the data , , c, wi, i 2 N :
wNnS 

c
respectively wNnS 
c  (wN )2

respectively wNnS 
  c
2
Subcase 1. Suppose wNnS  c . Since  > c, it follows that y + wNnS >  for all y  0
and thus, the determination of v(S) concerns only the second objective function g2(y) on
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[0; wS]. Due to γS  0 (because of the additional assumption wNnS  c ), we conclude that
the maximizer yS for the maximization problem (2.1) with respect to coalition S is given by
yS = 0 and thus, v(S) = 0 whenever wNnS  c .
Subcase 2. Suppose c
2
 wNnS  c . Since γS  0 as well as γS   −wNnS , the objective
function for the maximization problem (2.1) with respect to coalition S is increasing on
[0; γS ] and next decreasing. Hence, its maximizer yS is γS , provided γS  wS . In other
words, the maximizer yS equals γS or wS , whichever is less. Hence, yS = min[γS ; wS ] and
thus, v(S) = yS 
h

yS+wNnS
− c
i
whenever c
2
 wNnS  c .
Subcase 3. Suppose 0  wNnS  c2 . By  > c and wN >  , we obtain wNnS < c as well as
wNnS <
c(wN )2
 . That is, 0  γS < wS as well as γS  −wNnS. Thus, the objective function
for the maximization problem (2.1) with respect to coalition S is increasing on [0;  −wNnS ]
(due to its linear piece) and next decreasing. Hence, its maximizer yS equals  − wNnS and
thus, v(S) =
h

 − wNnS
i
 (− c) whenever 0  wNnS  c2 .
In summary, we conclude the following results:
yS =
8><>:
0 if wNnS  c ;
min[γS ; wS ] if c2  wNnS  c ;

 − wNnS if 0  wNnS  c2 :
(2.10)
v(S) =
8>><>>:
0 if wNnS  c ;
yS 
h

yS+wNnS
− c
i
if c
2
 wNnS  c ;h

 − wNnS
i
 (− c) if 0  wNnS  c2 :
(2.11)
In spite of its complexity, the common pool game hN; vi of (2.11) turns out to be a convex
game according to the theory developed in the next section concerning common pool games
with respect to linear cost functions.
3 The Common Pool Game: the case of a linear cost function
In the context of the study on the convexity property for the common pool game, it turns out
that the general framework needs additional (individually or jointly) assumptions about the
cost function c as well as the average joint production function h. For the special case with
a linear cost function, however, the convexity of the common pool game will be established
(without any further assumptions on either c or h) by means of a tricky, but elegant proof. We
start to present this elegant proof for this special case because it is extremely illustrative how
to proceed with the more complicated treatment concerning the general case (with additional
assumptions). Throughout the various forthcoming convexity proofs, we refer to the maxi-
mizer(s) for the maximization problem (2.1) with respect to dierent coalitions. Formally, for
any T  N , T 6= ;, let yT 2 [0; wT ] be some maximizer for the maximization problem (2.1)
with respect to coalition T (provided it exists), that is v(T ) = yT  h(yT + wNnT )− c(yT ).
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Theorem 3.1. Let hN; vi be the common pool game of (2.1) supposing the cost function c
is linear, i.e., c(y) := c  y for all y  0 and a certain constant c  0. That is,
v(S) := max
0ywS

y  h(y + wNnS)− c for all S  N , S 6= ;. (3.1)
Without any further assumption on the (weakly decreasing) average joint production function
h, the common pool game hN; vi of (3.1) is a convex game (i.e., (1.4) holds).
Proof. Instead of the classical convexity condition (1.4), we prove the following equivalent
convexity condition (based on the choice T = S [ fjg):
v(S [ fig)− v(S)  v(S [ fi; jg)− v(S [ fjg) whenever S  Nnfi; jg with i 6= j. (3.2)
Let i; j 2 N , i 6= j, and S  Nnfi; jg. Concerning the maximization problems (3.1) with
respect to the two coalitions S [ fig and S [ fjg respectively, we are interested in their
maximizers yS[fig and yS[fjg respectively in order to derive the following two equalities:
v(S [ fig) = yS[fig 

h(yS[fig + wNn(S[fig))− c

(3.3)
v(S [ fjg) = yS[fjg 

h(yS[fjg + wNn(S[fjg))− c

(3.4)
Concerning the maximization problems (3.1) with respect to the two coalitions S[fi; jg and
S respectively, we are interested in the feasible allocations yS[fjg + wi 2 [0; wS[fi; jg] and
yS[fig − wi 2 [0; wS ] respectively in order to derive the following two inequalities:
v(S [ fi; jg)  yS[fjg + wi  h(yS[fjg + wi + wNn(S[fi; jg))− c (3.5)
v(S)  yS[fig − wi  h(yS[fig − wi + wNnS)− c (3.6)
Notice that yS[fjg + wi 2 [0; wS[fi; jg] always holds, whereas yS[fig − wi 2 [0; wS ] holds if
and only if yS[fig  wi. Moreover, (3.6) does not apply at all whenever S = ;. By (3.3)-(3.6),
together with the common relationship wNnT = wk + wNn(T[fkg) whenever T  Nnfkg, we
arrive at the following two inequalities:
v(S [ fi; jg) − v(S [ fjg)  wi 

h(yS[fjg + wNn(S[fjg))− c

(3.7)
v(S [ fig) − v(S)  wi 

h(yS[fig + wNn(S[fig))− c

(3.8)
where the latter inequality (3.8) is valid only if yS[fig  wi and S 6= ;. Clearly, the alternative
convexity condition (3.2) is a direct consequence of both inequalities (3.7)-(3.8) as soon as
the weakly decreasing function h satises the next condition:
h(yS[fjg +wNn(S[fjg))  h(yS[fig + wNn(S[fig)) or equivalently, (3.9)
yS[fjg + wNn(S[fjg)  yS[fig + wNn(S[fig) or equivalently,
yS[fjg − wj  yS[fig − wi (3.10)
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In fact, the latter inequality (3.10) may be considered as an assumption, without loss of
generality, because the roles of both players i and j in the alternative convexity condition
(3.2) are interchangeable (that is, the relevant condition (3.2) does not change at all by
interchanging the two players). In other words, in case the assumption yS[fjg−wj  yS[fig−
wi is not valid (or equivalently, yS[fig − wi  yS[fjg − wj), then an identical proof applies
in which player i takes the role of player j (and vice versa). This completes the proof of the
exact outline of the alternative convexity condition (3.2), provided yS[fig  wi and S 6= ;. It
remains to establish the proof of (3.2) whenever 0  yS[fig  wi. Note that the remaining
case covers the subcase S = ; too because of 0  yfig  wi. Moreover, the general inequalities
(3.7) and (3.9) are still valid.
>From (3.7), (3.9) and the assumption 0  yS[fig  wi respectively, we conclude that the
following chain of inequalities holds:
v(S [ fi; jg) − v(S [ fjg)  wi 

h(yS[fjg + wNn(S[fjg))− c

 wi 

h(yS[fig + wNn(S[fig))− c

 yS[fig 

h(yS[fig + wNn(S[fig))− c

= v(S [ fig)  v(S [ fig) − v(S)
where the latter inequality is due to the fact that v(S)  0 (such that v(S) = 0 if S = ;). This
completes the full proof of the convexity property (3.2) for the common pool game assuming
a linear cost function. 2
4 Convexity of the Common Pool Game: the general case
This section aims to introduce the weakest form of any conditions (involving the cost function
c as well as the average joint production function h) that are sucient to guarantee the
convexity of the common pool game. Concerning the symmetric case (in which all the players
are supposed to possess identical endowments), we claim that it suces for both the marginal
costs and the average costs to be weakly decreasing (e.g., c(x) :=
p
x). Generally speaking, we
claim that, for convexity of the common pool game, it suces that marginal costs are weakly
decreasing in such a way that the dierence of two marginal costs is bounded above by some
marginal returns of the average joint production function. For the case with a linear cost
function, the latter condition fully agrees with the assumption that h is a weakly decreasing
function. Before we start to prove these two main results, we recall that the common pool
game hN; vi of (2.1) is a monotonic game, i.e., v(S [ fig)  v(S) for all i 2 N and all
S  Nnfig. Particularly, if wi = 0, then v(S [ fig) = v(S) for all S  Nnfig.
Denition 4.1. Consider a common pool situation with players’ endowments wi  0, i 2 N ,
the cost function c : R+ ! R+ satisfying c(0) = 0 as well as the average joint production
function h : R+ ! R+. The derivative c : R+  R++ ! R of the cost function c is given
by (c)(x; ) := c(x+)−c(x) for all x  0 and all  > 0. With every coalition T  N , T 6= ;,
there is associated the net-benet function bT : R+  R++ ! R given by
bT (x; ) := h(x+ + wNnT )− (c)(x; ) for all x  0 and all  > 0. (4.1)
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In words, bT (x; ) represents the net-benet for coalition T whenever the initial production
level x is increased by the amount of , assuming that any member j of the complementary
coalition NnT invests the full individual endowment wj . For any T  N , T 6= ;, recall that
yT 2 [0; wT ] denotes some maximizer for the maximization problem (2.1) with respect to
coalition T .
Theorem 4.2. The common pool game hN; vi of (2.1) is a convex game (i.e., (1.4) holds)
whenever the cost function c and the various net-benet functions bT , T  N , T 6= ;, satisfy
the following two conditions (4.2) and (4.3) respectively:
(i) The cost derivative c (or equivalently, the marginal cost function) is weakly decreasing,
that is
(c)(x; )  (c)(y; ) for all y  x  0 and all  > 0 (4.2)
(ii) The net-benet functions are weakly increasing with respect to the inclusion of sets,
that is
bS[fi;jg(yS[fjg; wi)  bS[fig(yS[fig − wi; wi) (4.3)
for all i; j 2 N , i 6= j, and all S  Nnfi; jg, S 6= ;, with yS[fig  wi > 0.
Remark 4.3. Concerning the sequential process of the formation of the grand coalition N ,
any player i can join any coalition T  Nnfig and produce a net-benet bT[fig(z;wi) by
investing the individual endowment wi additional to the initial production level z of coalition
T . In this setting, the fundamental condition (4.3) requires that the larger the coalition to
which a player joins, the higher the enlarged coalition’s net-benet, taken into account certain
(optimal or feasible) production levels for the smaller and larger coalition respectively. Thus,
(4.3) guarantees that there exist strong incentives for mutual cooperation and so, these strong
preferences for the formation of the grand coalition do overcome the tragedy of the commons
(in the framework of common pool situations), as has been mentioned by [4].
Remark 4.4. Condition (4.3) will be simplied, but strengthened if the (unknown) maxi-
mizers are replaced by arbitrary real numbers as follows. For notation’ sake, write x1 :=
yS[fjg − wj , x2 := yS[fig − wi, z := wNnS , and 1 := wi, 2 := wj . Now (4.3) will be
strengthened to the next fundamental condition:
h(x1 + z)− h(x2 + z)  (c)(x1 + 2; 1)− (c)(x2; 1) (4.4)
whenever x2  0, x1 + z  0, 1 > 0 and 2 > 0. Without loss of generality, we may assume
x1  x2 (because the roles of both players i and j in the alternative convexity condition
(3.2) are interchangeable). Notice that, if the cost function c is linear, then (4.4) reduces
to h(x1 + z)  h(x2 + z) whenever x1 + z  x2 + z, which result holds true since h is a
weakly decreasing function. Moreover, (4.4) applied to x1 = x2 reduces to the inequality
(c)(x1; 1)  (c)(x1 + 2; 1) for all x1  0, all 1 > 0, and all 2 > 0, that is, the marginal
costs are weakly decreasing. We conclude that the concavity of the cost function c (i.e.,
c00  0) is a desirable property, together with (4.4). Under the additional (but not necessary)
assumption that the cost function c is convex (i.e., c00  0), then the only remaining possible
cost function is the linear one as studied in the previous section.
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In summary, the common pool game hN; vi of (2.1) is a convex game whenever the (weakly
decreasing) cost derivative function c and the (weakly decreasing) average joint production
function h satisfy the mutual condition (4.4). In words, the boundedness above of the dif-
ference of two marginal costs by a particular marginal return of the average joint production
function is sucient for the convexity of the common pool game.
Corollary 4.5. Consider the symmetric case in that all the players possess identical endow-
ments, i.e., suppose wi := w for all i 2 N . The symmetrical common pool game hN; vi of (2.1)
is a convex game (i.e., (1.4) holds) whenever the cost function c has both weakly decreasing
marginal costs and weakly decreasing average costs respectively in the following sense:
c(x)− c(x− w)  c(x+ w)− c(x) for all x  w and
c(x+ w)
x+ w
 c(x)
x
for all 0 < x  w. Example: c(x) := px
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Instead of the classical convexity condition (1.4), we prove the
alternative convexity condition (3.2), that is
v(S [ fig) − v(S)  v(S [ fi; jg) − v(S [ fjg) whenever S  Nnfi; jg with i 6= j.
Let i; j 2 N , i 6= j, and S  Nnfi; jg. Notice that the roles of both players i and
j in the alternative convexity condition (3.2) are interchangeable. If wi = 0 or wj = 0,
then the inequality in (3.2) is an equality because i or j respectively is a dummy player.
If v(S [ fig) = 0, then the inequality in (3.2) becomes trivial due to the monotonicity of
the common pool game (yielding v(S) = 0 as well as v(S [ fi; jg)  v(S [ fjg)). Thus,
in the remainder, we may suppose, without loss of generality, that the endowments and the
maximizers satisfy both wi > 0, wj > 0 and yS[fig > 0, yS[fjg > 0.
Concerning the maximization problems (2.1) with respect to the two coalitions S [ fig and
S [ fjg respectively, we are interested in their maximizers yS[fig and yS[fjg respectively in
order to derive the following two equalities:
v(S [ fig) = yS[fig  h(yS[fig + wNn(S[fig))− c(yS[fig) (4.5)
v(S [ fjg) = yS[fjg  h(yS[fjg + wNn(S[fjg))− c(yS[fjg) (4.6)
Concerning the maximization problems (2.1) with respect to the two coalitions S[fi; jg and
S respectively, we are interested in the feasible allocations yS[fjg + wi 2 [0; wS[fi; jg] and
yS[fig − wi 2 [0; wS ] respectively in order to derive the following two inequalities:
v(S [ fi; jg)  yS[fjg + wi  h(yS[fjg + wi + wNn(S[fi; jg))− c(yS[fjg + wi) (4.7)
v(S)  yS[fig − wi  h(yS[fig − wi + wNnS)− c(yS[fig − wi) (4.8)
Notice that yS[fjg + wi 2 [0; wS[fi; jg] always holds, whereas yS[fig − wi 2 [0; wS ] holds if
and only if yS[fig  wi. Moreover, (4.8) does not apply at all whenever S = ;. By (4.5)-(4.8),
together with the common relationship wNnT = wk + wNn(T[fkg) whenever T  Nnfkg, we
arrive at the following two inequalities:
v(S [ fi; jg) − v(S [ fjg)  wi  h(yS[fjg + wNn(S[fjg)) + c(yS[fjg)− c(yS[fjg + wi) (4.9)
v(S [ fig)− v(S)  wi  h(yS[fig + wNn(S[fig)) + c(yS[fig − wi)− c(yS[fig)(4.10)
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where the latter inequality (4.10) is valid only if yS[fig  wi and S 6= ;. Clearly, in order to
deduce the alternative convexity condition (3.2) directly from both inequalities (4.9)-(4.10),
the weakest form of any condition is that both functions h and c satisfy the next condition:
h(yS[fjg+wNn(S[fjg))−(c)(yS[fjg; wi)  h(yS[fig+wNn(S[fig))−(c)(yS[fig−wi; wi)(4.11)
provided yS[fig  wi and S 6= ;. Clearly, (4.11) is fully equivalent to (4.3).
Finally, it remains to prove the alternative convexity condition (3.2) in the degenerated case
0  yS[fig  wi. Note that the remaining case covers the subcase S = ; too because of
0  yfig  wi. Moreover, the general inequalities (4.9) and the assumption (3.9) are still
valid.
>From (4.9), (3.9) and the assumption 0 < yS[fig  wi respectively, we conclude that the
following chain of (in)equalities holds:
v(S [ fi; jg) − v(S [ fjg)
 wi  h(yS[fjg + wNn(S[fjg))−

c(yS[fjg + wi)− c(yS[fjg)

 wi  h(yS[fig + wNn(S[fig))−

c(yS[fjg + wi)− c(yS[fjg)

= wi 

h(yS[fig + wNn(S[fig))−
c(yS[fjg + wi)− c(yS[fjg)
wi

 yS[fig 

h(yS[fig +wNn(S[fig))−
c(yS[fjg + wi)− c(yS[fjg)
wi

= v(S [ fig) + c(yS[fig)− yS[fig 

c(yS[fjg + wi)− c(yS[fjg)
wi

 v(S [ fig)  v(S [ fig) − v(S) (since v(S)  0)
where the last inequality but one reduces to the following inequality:
c(yS[fig)
yS[fig
 c(yS[fjg + wi)− c(yS[fjg)
wi
given that 0 < yS[fig  wi: (4.12)
Since the marginal cost function is supposed to be weakly decreasing, together with the
assumption 0 < yS[fig  wi, and the fact that the average cost function c(x)x is weakly
decreasing (by concavity of c), we conclude that the following chain of inequalities holds:
c(yS[fjg + wi)− c(yS[fjg)
wi
 c(0 + wi)− c(0)
wi
=
c(wi)
wi
 c(yS[fig)
yS[fig
This proves the claim (4.12) and thus, this completes the proof of the alternative convexity
condition (3.2) in the degenerated case 0 < yS[fig  wi. This proves Theorem 4.2. 2
Proof of Corollary 4.5. Suppose wi := w for all i 2 N . Clearly, for any T  N , T 6= ;,
the maximizer yT for the maximization problem (2.1) with respect to coalition T depends
not anymore on the players in T , but only on the coalition size. Thus, yS[fig = yS[fjg for all
i; j 2 N , i 6= j, and S  Nnfi; jg. Consequently, in the previous proof, the rst fundamental
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condition (4.11) reduces to the following condition: c(x)−c(x−w)  c(x+w)−c(x) whenever
x  w. Moreover, the second fundamental condition (4.12) reduces to the following condition:
c(x)
x
 c(x+ w)− c(x)
w
or equivalently,
c(x+w)
x+ w
 c(x)
x
whenever 0 < x  w:
This proves Corollary 4.5. 2
5 Average-Convexity of the general Common Pool Game
As shown by Proposition 2.4, the common pool game with a general cost function may fail to
be convex. In this section our main goal is to investigate a certain relaxation of the convexity
condition known as the average-convexity condition. The common pool TU-game hN; vi is
said to be average-convex if its characteristic function v : P(N) ! R, as given by (2.1),
satises the following condition (cf. [5]):X
i2S

v(S)− v(Snfig)


X
i2S

v(T )− v(Tnfig)

for all S  T  N , S 6= ;. (5.1)
Note that convex games satisfy the average-convexity condition (by summing up, over all
i 2 S, the valid convexity conditions v(S)− v(Snfig)  v(T )− v(Tnfig)). The main theorem
states the weakest form of any conditions (involving weighted sums of the various net-benet
functions bT , T  N , T 6= ;; see Denition 4.1) that are sucient to guarantee the average-
convexity of the common pool game.
Theorem 5.1. The common pool game hN; vi of (2.1) is an average-convex game (i.e., (5.1)
holds) whenever the endowments wi, i 2 N , and the various net-benet functions bT , T  N ,
T 6= ;, satisfy the next mutual condition: for all ; 6= S $ T  N with yS > 0 it holdsX
i2S
wi  bT (yTnfig; wi) 
X
i2S;
wiyS
wi  bS(yS − wi; wi) + bS(0; yS) 
X
i2S;
wiyS
wi (5.2)
The technical and tedious proof will be omitted, but is available upon request (cf. [2]).
Remark 5.2. In the setting of the sequential process of the formation of the grand coalition
N , condition (5.2) requires that the weighted sum of net-benets of members of a coalition S
with respect to the formation of a superset T is at least as much as the one with respect to
the formation of the coalition itself. The latter weighted sum is decomposed into two types
of a weighted sum since every member i of coalition S invests his individual endowment wi
(to contribute to the joint optimal production level yS of coalition S) or invests the optimal
production level yS himself, whichever is less.
In case of a linear cost function c, condition (5.2) reduces toX
i2S
wi  h(yTnfig + wi + wNnT )  h(yS + wNnS) 
X
i2S
wi for all ; 6= S $ T  N .
In fact, we claim that every separate term h(yTnfig + wi + wNnT ) − h(yS + wNnS), i 2 S,
is non-negative. For that purpose, because h is a weakly decreasing function, it suces
to check that yTnfig + wi + wNnT  yS + wNnS or equivalently, yTnfig + wi  yS + wTnS
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whenever ; 6= S $ T  N and i 2 S. In case T = S [ fjg for some j 2 TnS, then the
relevant inequality yTnfig + wi  yTnfjg + wj (where i 2 S, j 62 S) may be treated as an
assumption based on the interchangeability of the two players i; j with respect to the expres-
sion [v(S [ fjg) − v((S [ fjg)nfig)]− [v(S)− v(Snfig)] or equivalently, [v(S [ fjg) − v(S)]−
[v((S [ fjg)nfig) − v(Snfig)]. In case TnS contains at least two players, then the inequal-
ity yTnfig + wi  yS + wTnS follows by a similar argument. Particularly, these observations
establish the average-convexity of common pool games with respect to linear cost functions,
although the proof of the average convexity through (5.2) is much more dicult to complete
in comparison to its convexity proof as treated in Section 3.
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6 APPENDIX: the Proof of Theorem 5.1
Theorem 6.1. The common pool game hN; vi of (2.1) is an average-convex game (i.e., (5.1)
holds) whenever the endowments wi, i 2 N , and the various net-benet functions bT , T  N ,
T 6= ;, satisfy the next mutual condition: for all ; 6= S $ T  N with yS > 0 it holdsX
i2S
wi  bT (yTnfig; wi) 
X
i2S;
wiyS
wi  bS(yS − wi; wi) + bS(0; yS) 
X
i2S;
wiyS
wi (6.1)
Proof. To start with, recall that the classical convexity condition (1.4) has been replaced by
the equivalent convexity condition (3.2) (due to the choice T = S[fjg), in which condition the
roles of both players i and j are interchangeable. A similar simplication (based on the choice
T = S [ fjg) is not applicable to the average-convexity condition (5.1) since the equivalence
of the two resulting conditions turns out to be lost. Moreover, the interchangeable roles of
two players is lost too because the average-convexity condition (5.1) deals with the marginal
contributions of all the players in any coalition.
In order to investigate the average-convexity property for the common pool game hN; vi of
(2.1), let S $ T  N where S 6= ;. Concerning the maximization problems (2.1) with respect
to the coalitions S and Tnfig, i 2 S, respectively, we are interested in their maximizers yS
and yTnfig, i 2 S, respectively in order to derive the following equalities:
v(S) = yS  h(yS + wNnS)− c(yS) (6.2)
v(Tnfig) = yTnfig  h(yTnfig + wNn(Tnfig))− c(yTnfig) for every i 2 S: (6.3)
If ys = 0, then v(S) = 0 and the inequality in (5.1) becomes trivial due to the monotonicity
of the common pool game (yielding v(Snfig) = 0 for all i 2 S as well as v(T )  v(Tnfig) for
all i 2 S). Thus, without loss of generality, suppose yS > 0.
Notice that Tnfig 6= ; for all i 2 S since T contains at least two players. Concerning the
maximization problem (2.1) with respect to coalition T , we are interested, for every i 2 S,
in the feasible allocations yTnfig + wi 2 [0; wT ] respectively in order to derive the following
system of inequalities:
v(T )  yTnfig + wi  h(yTnfig + wi + wNnT )− c(yTnfig +wi) for every i 2 S: (6.4)
By (6.3)-(6.4), together with the common relationship wNn(Tnfig)) = wi + wNnT whenever
i 2 T , we arrive at the following system of inequalities: for all i 2 S
v(T )− v(Tnfig)  wi  h(yTnfig + wi + wNnT )−

c(yTnfig + wi)− c(yTnfig)

or equivalently, v(T )− v(Tnfig)  wi  bT (yTnfig; wi) for all i 2 S. (6.5)
(cf. (4.1)). By summing up (6.5) over all i 2 S, we obtain the following inequality:X
i2S

v(T )− v(Tnfig)


X
i2S
wi  bT (yTnfig; wi) (6.6)
Concerning the maximization problems (2.1) with respect to the various coalitions Snfig,
i 2 S, we are interested, for every i 2 S, in the feasible allocations yS − wi 2 [0; wSnfig]
respectively in order to derive the following system of inequalities:
v(Snfig)  [yS − wi]  h(yS − wi + wNn(Snfig))− c(yS − wi) provided yS  wi: (6.7)
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By (6.2) and (6.7), we arrive, for every i 2 S satisfying yS  wi, at the following inequality:
v(S)− v(Snfig)  wi  h(yS + wNnS)−

c(yS)− c(yS − wi)

or equivalently,
v(S)− v(Snfig)  wi  bS(yS − wi; wi) for all i 2 S satisfying yS  wi. (6.8)
In case 0 < yS  wi (e.g. if coalition S consists of an individual), then we conclude that the
following chain of (in)equalities holds:
v(S)− v(Snfig)  v(S) (since v(Snfig)  0)
= yS 

h(yS + wNnS)−
c(yS)
yS

(by (6.2))
 wi 

h(yS + wNnS)−
c(yS)
yS

(by assumption of yS  wi)
and consequently,
v(S)− v(Snfig)  wi  bS(0; yS) for all i 2 S satisfying 0 < yS  wi: (6.9)
By summing up (6.8) and (6.9) over all i 2 S, we obtain the following inequality:X
i2S

v(S)− v(Snfig)


X
i2S;
wiyS
wi  bS(yS − wi; wi) + bS(0; yS) 
X
i2S;
wiyS
wi (6.10)
Clearly, in order to deduce the average-convexity condition (5.1) directly from both in-
equalities (6.6) and (6.10), the weakest form of any condition is given by (6.1) (provided
; 6= S $ T  N and yS > 0). This completes the proof of Theorem 5.1. 2
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